Abstract-This paper presents an asymmetric watermarking method as an alternative to classical direct sequence spread spectrum and watermarking Costa schemes techniques. This new method provides a higher security level against malicious attacks threatening watermarking techniques used for a copy protection purpose. This application, which is quite different from the classical copyright enforcement issue, is extremely challenging as no public algorithm is yet known to be secure enough, and some proposed proprietary techniques have been already hacked. Our method is thus an attempt toward the proof that the Kerckhoffs principle can be stated in the copy protection framework.
I. INTRODUCTION

D
IGITAL watermarking is the art of hiding information in digital contents such as images, audio clips, and videos. This art is useful in many various applications, but this paper only deals with the copy protection scenario. Although the role of the watermark is very simple in this application, some particular constraints render the subject extremely challenging. The main concern is the assessment of a security level according to the Kerckhoffs principle.
A. Challenge for the Watermarking Community
To build a copy protection system for consumer electronic devices, we are looking for a technique that could hide, in original content, a signal commonly called a watermark. Compliant devices such as players or recorders are able to detect the presence of this watermark. In this particular case, its presence means that the content is protected, and hence, it is illegal to copy it. Watermarking is used as a means to distinguish personal or copy-free data from protected copyrighted contents. Real-world copy protection systems are indeed more complex, but this simple description brings enough severe issues. The technical requirements are well known for this kind of application in the watermarking community:
• no perceptual distortion (watermarking should not spoil the entertainment of the contents); • one-bit payload (detectors only check for a presence of a watermark); • robustness to common content processing like coarser source coding, D/A A/D transformation, lowpass filtering , etc.;
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• low complexity of the detection algorithm;
• relative security. The fifth criterion must be detailed. What is the difference between security and robustness? In one hand, robustness measures the impact on the detection capability of common transformations applied nonintentionally or intentionally to the protected contents. If intentional, they are qualified as blind attacks because it is a hopeless attempt from the pirates to remove the watermark. They know nothing about watermarking, and they hope such transformations could remove its protection. On the other hand, security measures the impact on the detection capability of intentional processing dedicated to a certain class of watermarking techniques. They are sometimes called malicious attacks in the sense that the pirates know perfectly well the watermark embedding and detection algorithms, and they look for flaws in this targeted technique.
This criterion is somewhat subjective. For instance, the motto of the CPTWG, 1 which is one of the first industrial forums dealing with copy protection systems, is "Keep Honest People Honest." Thus means that the watermarking technique does not provide a high level of security. Its hack must not be obvious so that it stays out of the reach of "honest people." Nevertheless, another industrial forum, known as the SDMI, 2 was more concerned about security as this requirement clearly appeared in the call for proposal. The rationale under this concern might be the following scenario: Imagine a well-trained pirate has disclosed a reproducible hack; he has implemented it in a user-friendly software, and he distributes it on the Internet, so that, now, removing the watermark is just a mouse click away for the not so "honest people." SDMI has launched a challenge to evaluate four proposed audio watermarking techniques. The watermarking community performed very well as at least two research teams broke all proposed techniques [1] , [2] . This shows that some companies have proposed solutions with no assessment of their security level. These techniques were robust but not secure. They thought that their algorithms would be kept secret so that the pirates would have no clue as to hack them. This rationale is called "Secrecy by Obscurity." The SDMI hacks revealed that this motto may lead to very hazardous solutions, but pulling down techniques and pointing out possible flaws is not the only role of the academic community. It has to prove whether better solutions are achievable or not.
The fundamental basement of cryptography has been established in 1874 by Kerckhoffs [3] . He stated that the designer of a crypto-system must suppose that the opponent knows his algorithms in detail, except for a parameter called the secret key. Hence, the security of the crypto-system must only stem from storing the secret key in a safe place, the rest of the system being public. The Kerckhoffs principle is a heuristic defended by two facts.
• There are proprietary algorithms (i.e., violating the Kerckhoffs principle) that have been hacked. The book [4] gives numerous examples. The most famous is the hack of the Enigma encryption machine during the Second World War.
• There are public encryption algorithms that remain unbroken (e.g., RSA, DES).
Our work is only motivated by this simple question: Is the Kerckhoffs principle a valid concept in watermarking for copy protection? The episode of the SDMI challenge illustrates the first item toward a positive answer, but watermarking is too young a science to get any assessment of the second item. So far, there has been no public and secure watermarking algorithm for copy protection applications. The issue about the validity of this principle is extremely important. Let us analyze the two alternatives.
• The Kerckhoffs principle is not valid. Every watermarking technique will be developed in secrecy. The academic research on this topic and its publications and conferences is no longer justified. Patenting new techniques is also no longer possible. As no public study about security assessment is available, nobody can compare or trust the proposed techniques. In cryptography, one always claims that no algorithm can be kept secret for more than two years in the consumer electronic industry. These watermarking techniques are then likely to be hacked periodically.
• The Kerckhoffs principle is valid. This gives credit to the academic research. This community can analyze techniques to assess their security level. These results are public. It shares more and more experiences so that the security level increases. Industries will then launch a fair and reliable business once the techniques are mature. The watermarking community is about to approve this fundamental principle for some applications. For instance, steganography is an application where, thanks to works from Cachin, one knows how to measure a security level [5] , the stego-system being public. In the same way, the community has made a lot of improvements in copyright protection: Some malicious attacks (e.g., the deadlock problem [6] and the "copy attack" [7] ) have been spotted, and counter attacks have been proposed. It seems that in the copy protection application, this "attacks/counter attacks" virtuous mechanism is not engaged due to the "Secrecy by Obscurity" argument.
This paper aims to propose an alternative solution to the classical watermarking schemes. This stronger solution would argue for the use of the Kerckhoffs principle for copy protection applications. The document is structured as follows. A brief overview of the watermarking processes introduces the basic notation. It is followed by a threat analysis in the copy protection framework in Section II. Asymmetric schemes are presented as a counter-attack to the spotted threats. We describe in Section III one of these methods, especially its unusual detection algorithm, whose design requires some skills in testing hypothesis in spectral analysis. The security level provided by this asymmetric method is assessed in Section IV. The simulations of Section V confirm the previous analysis.
II. CONVENTIONAL WATERMARKING
This section details two different watermarking methods. Assuming that they fulfill the robustness and perceptibility constraints, attention is focused on the security criterion in the context of copy protection.
A. Notation
We set in this paragraph the usual structure of the watermarking scheme. It is described with the notation of [8] and [9] .
The goal of the embedding algorithm is to select the most important perceptual features of covert content and to add a very small amount of watermark energy to each of them. From a piece of cover content belonging to the "media space," an extraction function maps the cover data into a feature vector of the "watermark space:"
. Denote as the length of this extracted vector. The role of the embedding process is to modify into a vector belonging to the critical region of the "watermark space." This region is composed with extracted vectors considered to be watermarked by the detector. The modification is performed by the "mixing function"
, which mixes the desired watermark signal with the extracted vector:
. The "inverse extraction" function finishes the embedding process. It maps back from the "watermark space" to the "media space:"
. This modification is made under the constraint that the resulting watermarked content is perceptually close to . The detection process gets an unknown received content . It extracts the vector and checks whether it belongs to critical region . Let denote the hypothesis when the received content is not watermarked and the alternative hypothesis. The detection is a decision rule whose output equals 1 if is considered to be watermarked and 0 otherwise. Usually, this hard decision is the comparison of the likelihood function with a positive threshold.
The performance of the detection is measured by the probability of false alarm , which is the probability that the detector claims received content is protected whereas it was not watermarked, and the power of the test , which is the probability that the detector correctly detects watermarked content. They are mathematically defined by and , where is the mathematical expectation of random variable .
The benefit of this model is that we tackle contents as vectors of length . Moreover, we assume that the vectors represent central stationary random processes whose autocorrelation functions are absolutely summable. In the simplest assumptions, vector is modeled as central Gaussian white noise of variance .
B. Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
Direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) is a modulation by a pseudo-random carrier invented during the World War II [10] . The term "spread" comes from the fact that the information to transmit (in this paper the presence of a watermark) has been embedded into a huge number of features. Hence, if the pirate succeeds in removing the watermark for some selected coefficients, there is enough energy left in the other features to detect the watermark. The carrier is generated by a pseudo-random generator seeded with a secret key, as is usually done in military digital communications. It provides the following well-known qualities [11] .
• The presence of the transmitted signal is hidden (low interception). This helps to respect the perceptual constraint.
• There is the ability to fight against interferences due to intentional scrambling, to other communications, or to selective channels (e.g., multipath channels). This brings robustness, and it helps to fight against collusion attacks.
• Security is ensured as soon as the pseudo-random carrier is kept secret. Receivers ignoring this carrier can neither decode the message nor change it. Jamming the communications then needs far more power. These properties explain the success of the DSSS modulation in the watermarking community. This paper clearly focuses on this technique as we hide one bit of information (presence or absence of watermark), through the embedding of a long pseudo random sequence in content.
Mathematically, the "mixing function" is the addition of the original extracted vector with a normalized pseudo random sequence , as defined in (2) , where gain fixes the watermark strength, linked to a relative watermark to original content power ratio: .
At the detection side, the likelihood function is usually defined by the linear correlation of (3), which is the optimal tested statistic following the Neyman-Pearson strategy, if is a white Gaussian vector.
The tested statistic being Gaussian distributed, its probability density function (pdf) is fully described by its mean and the variance under hypothesis , whose value is known to be Noting as the cumulative distribution function of , the following relations between , and easily come:
where is an increasing function of the deflection coefficient , equaling in the DSSS case:
C. Threat Analysis of DSSS
The watermark signal clearly appears in the detection process. If one knows this signal, one can easily change to forge pirated content . For instance, a pirate is sure that the following action will fool the detection process as it sets the correlation of (3) to zero, deluding the detector: (7) This is the reason why must remain secret.
The impact of the discovery of depends on the application. For copyright protection systems, it is likely that this secret vector, presumably issued by a trusted registration party, is different for each content. Hence, the knowledge of one signal only helps the pirates to forge one illegal piece of content, but for the copy protection framework, this knowledge may pull down the whole system: As explained below, all protected contents are watermarked with a unique vector .
The main issue of our security analysis is to know whether can remain secret in the copy protection framework. Here is a list of possible threats issued from [12] and [13] .
To average a huge amount of protected content: Due to a low cost constraint, the memory and computing power available at the detection side for extracting the vectors and calculating the correlation is very small. Hence, the secret vector is not very long. Due to the perceptual constraint, the watermark-to-content power ratio is very low. In many real-world techniques, the watermark signal is then tiled (i.e., repeated) all along the content. At the detection side, an average process increases the power ratio and, consequently, the efficiency of the test. This results in the fact that all protected contents are watermarked with the same secret, and moreover, each of them contains it several times. As the "mixing function" is often linear or nearly linear, an average of extracted vectors of independent protected contents gives an accurate estimation of this secret. To make a comparison with cryptography and its ciphertext-only attack [14] , this average attack belongs to a strategy called watermarked content only attack.
To defeat the embedding process: Designers of watermarking techniques must be careful that their embedder is not leaking some information about the secret while it watermarks special content. For instance, watermarking uniform (or smooth gradient) areas of pictures is not a good idea from a perceptual point of view, but it is also a real security threat: Pirates will easily isolate the components coming from the watermark signal. Another big issue is to watermark contents that have already been publicly disclosed. We can think of the following scenario: The content owners prefer to watermark their contents just before they are pressed on DVD or broadcast on the air. Trailers released several months ago when the movie was on screen could be a source of the cover contents. Making a difference in the "watermark space" between watermarked vectors and their corresponding original vector gives pirates a lot of information about the secret signal. Virtually, one pair of content is enough to reveal the secret sequence. This is a known cover content attack (in comparison with the cryptographic known plaintext attack [14] ).
To analyze the behavior of the detector: Cox and Linnartz pointed out that the pirates are able to estimate the secret vector just observing how the chip behaves for a given number of faked chosen contents [12] . Although dishonest users have only access to the binary decision (i.e., the content is watermarked or not), the detection output sufficiently leaks information about the secret key to achieve its accurate estimation. This attack takes tries, as proved by Kalker [15] . We call it the oracle attack.
To steal the secret by reverse engineering: The secret is located in all embedders and detectors. The embedders are not publicly available. They are placed in the preparation stage of the contents, e.g., in the movie studio. We assumed that this place is safe from secret leakage. In the copy protection framework, this assumption does not hold for the detectors since they will be implemented in hardware and placed in consumer electronic devices (e.g., DVD recorder). The reverse engineering of these devices is a real threat because tamper-proof hardware might be too expensive for the consumer electronic industry.
The reader not versed in security might be doubtful about these threats. There has been a lot of news about reverse engineering of security functions: game station (copy protection "mod" chip), DVD players (dezoning, encryption hack [16] ), mobile phones (authentication breaks), set top boxes (conditional access hacks), etc. Indeed, no security can be provided if a safe place where keys are stored does not exist. In this paper, we do not address the issue of how to avoid reverse engineering in hardware implementations, and we assume it is possible to do so. The other threats are somewhat more theoretical because no watermarking technique has really been deployed up to now. However, the SDMI challenge and its hacks provide us a good idea of the power of these "signal processing" hacks [1] , [2] .
We discard, in this paper, attacks like desynchronization via geometric transformations (still images) or sample frequency wobbling of audio contents because they belong more to the robustness issue, which should be tackled by the design of the extraction function. A watermarking technique will be more and more robust against these blind attacks. Forged contents' quality will be lower and lower, so that the pirates will give up this strategy, preferring the use of more powerful malicious attacks. Whereas robustness was so far the weak point focusing all the research efforts, the improvements achieved recently let us foresee that security will be the main issue in the future.
D. Watermarking Costa's Schemes
Watermarking Costa's schemes (WCSs) constitute another class of extremely popular watermarking processes based on Costa's paper [17] . A partition divides a constellation of independent reference vectors called codewords into disjoint codebooks:
. Each codebook is associated with a symbol to be transmitted. This allows transmitting one out of symbols per cover content. The mixing function acts like an attraction where the extracted vector is pushed toward the nearest codeword belonging to the codebook associated with the symbol to be transmitted. This codeword is denoted as it is the quantization of on the codebook .
The detection finds the closest codeword to the received vector. The decoded symbol is the index of the codebook to which this codeword belongs. For more explanations on possible constructions of the codebooks, partitions, and performances, see [18] - [20] .
Equation (8) clearly shows that the watermark signal is created with the knowledge of the original extracted vector. This is called the side-information at the embedding stage, and it yields schemes achieving (capacity/robustness against additive noise) characteristics far better than the ones resulting from DSSS. Side information is absolutely recommended for applications requiring a large capacity where the additive noise attack model is suitable, like steganography, copyright protection, fingerprinting, or content integrity verification.
Yet, no work has been done about the application of such methods to copy protection. A priori, Costa's idea is not suitable as it efficiently decodes hidden messages in watermarked content (that are structured in distinct ways at the embedding stage), whereas it is not designed to detect watermarks from original contents that are not at all structured. Only two research works tackle this issue.
The first idea is based on hard decision decoding [21] . A decoder fed with an original content retrieves a random message, depending on the nearest codeword to . These random messages are assumed to be uniformly distributed:
. Then, one protects the contents hiding the message . Hence, the test hypotheses becomes versus . Under hypothesis , the relation sets the size of the alphabet. Under hypothesis , the use of channel codes studied in [20] improves power of the test at a given watermark-to-noise power ratio.
The second idea is based on soft information, where the goal is to produce a measure of reliability of the decoding process. Knowing the embedded symbol , the pdf of the original and the watermarked vectors are significantly different so that a test based on likelihood is relevant:
. Performances are given in [20] .
However, as these methods rely on quantization on codebooks, their Achilles' heel is the amplitude scaling and offset attack. The critical region is a set of small cells centered on the codewords of . The watermarked vector can easily go out of the sphere by a change of amplitude. This imposes first the recovery of the equivalently scaled and offset constellation observing a possibly noisy version of watermarked vectors before being able to measure the likelihood. An estimation algorithm of scaled and offset codebooks for the scalar Costa scheme (SCS) is proposed in [20] . Note that DSSS is inherently more robust to these attacks as its critical region is compact and in one piece.
E. Threat Analysis of WCS
Although no work is reported on the application of WCS to the copy protection framework, it seems possible to do so regarding its detectability and robustness. Its security in this framework is now analyzed.
Let us analyze the watermarked content-only attack. Dithered modulation (DM), quantized index modulation (QIM), and SCS are competitive practical implementations of WCS where the constellation is structured as the product, component by component, of a uniform scalar quantizer:
. It is believed that a secret dithering vector would "secure" DM, QIM, and SCS such that is now a secret constellation. In the copy protection framework, there is only one instance of parameters and embedded in all consumer electronics devices. The challenge for pirates is to estimate the codebook (whence the critical region) observing watermarked vectors. This is exactly the goal of the estimation method we mentioned above! The dishonest users proceed on almost noiseless vectors coming from good quality watermarked contents, whereas the detector runs the same algorithm on possibly heavily attacked contents. Referring to [20] , in this condition, watermarked contents are necessary to estimate and within 1% of relative error. Once the codebook is discovered, the pirates forge good-quality pirated content thanks to, for instance, an inverse SCS algorithm with reduced distortion that is also available in [20] .
Things are slightly easier with a known cover content attack. Moreover, according to Mansour and Tewfik, an oracle attack is also possible against WCS [22] . Up to now, the actual practical implementations of WCS are not designed for the copy protection scenario. It is technically possible to adapt them to such a context where they will achieve better performances than DSSS. Yet, they do not provide better security levels than DSSS.
F. Conclusion
Section II sets the basic notation, and it makes an account of two widely used watermarking methods. We explain the reasons why attacks based on reverse engineering and on desynchronization are discarded in this paper. The main analysis focuses on three attacks that are typical from the copy protection scenario. It turns out that the classical watermarking methods give low security levels in this context.
III. ASYMMETRIC WATERMARKING METHODS
Hartung and Girod's paper is the very first paper to introduce the notion of public-key (and thus asymmetric) watermarking [23] . Although the proposed solution was not at all secure, it stressed the issue that the would-be secret key of DSSS cannot remain a secret in some applications. Recently, new asymmetric watermarking schemes have been proposed as an interesting alternative especially for the copy protection framework [24] - [29] . Although invented independently, the authors showed that these methods shared the same detection algorithm (i.e., the correlation is replaced by a quadratic form) and that they have similar performances [30] . The only exception is the work from and Picard and Robert based on neural networks [31] . Moreover, we would like to point out the very interesting work from Gomes et al., who improved our scheme so that decoding of hidden messages and not only detection of a watermark signal is achieved [32] .
The concept of asymmetry must be understood as a method and not as a complete technique. This method is based on the same breakdown structure explained in Section II-A. The only changes are the way watermark signals are created and the definition of the critical region, i.e., the decision rule. This allows us to derive an asymmetric version from any classical watermarking techniques. The implementation of an asymmetric method to the well-known Boney Tewfik audio watermarking technique is contained in [33] and [34] . The performance comparison of an extremely robust still images watermarking technique and its asymmetric version is contained in [35] and [36] .
A. Basic Idea: Randomized Embedding
In the classical watermarking methods described in Section II, the creation of the watermark signal is deterministic. In DSSS, plays the role of the secret key; hence, it is constant in the copy protection framework. In WCS, is a fixed function of given by (8) . The main idea of asymmetric methods is to transform the watermark embedding into a random processing. The watermark signal depends on a secret key and on a random variable. Hence, two watermarked versions of the same original content are different as the random variable changes each time the embedding is run.
This idea is not new in security. This kind of variable is called a random in cryptography. Goldwasser-Micali, El Gamal, and Blum-Goldwasser encryptions are examples of such probabilistic encryption schemes [37] . The random is here to cast a given property of the signals emitted by the embedding stage without revealing their exact nature.
The challenge resides on how to enforce an idea coming from cryptography in the signal processing field. The difficulty is that the detector ignores the random used at the embedding stage. It only knows the secret key and, therefore, there is an asymmetry between the embedding and the detection. The detector cannot check whether a precise signal has been hidden in content. It must detect the presence of watermark signals without knowing their exact values. The technical solution found so far by watermarkers cited above is to use second-order statistics. The detector verifies whether the received content has a particular statistical property (related to a secret key), which is due to the presence of a random watermark signal. This property cannot be expected from usual original contents. The way we implemented this idea in our method is described in the following subsection.
B. Example of an Asymmetric Method
The creation of watermark signals is as sketched in Fig. 1 . First, a pseudo-random generator fed by the random gives a white Gaussian noise with variance unity. This signal goes through a filter whose frequency response module matches with a given spectrum's template . The filter is normalized so that . The resulting colored noise is interleaved by a pseudo-random permutation of the vectors indexes to give the final watermark signal.
where is the convolution product. Finally, this watermark sequence will be embedded into sequence thanks to the "mixing function" of (2), and the "inverse extraction function" concludes the watermarking process. Compared to DSSS, the embedding process remains unchanged, except for the creation of the sequence .
The detection process first extracts a received vector that goes through the deinterleaver . This vector is then a mix of the interleaved extracted vector coming from the cover content and, if the received content is watermarked, a colored noise whose spectrum is shaped like . The permutation is assumed to have a perfect whitening action. The detection does not know the watermark signal but only the deinterleaver and the spectrum's template.
C. Testing Hypothesis
The goal of this subsection is to define the decision rule for this asymmetric method. The structure of the detector is sketched in Fig. 2. 1) Simple Hypothesis Test: It is extremely difficult to define a cost when the detector takes wrong decisions so that Bayes or minimax strategies are not really suited for our purpose. Yet, the usual constraint on the detection (see SDMI or CPTWG calls for proposal) is to fix an upper level of the probability of false alarms . This clearly references to a Neyman-Pearson test, which is the most powerful among all the tests with respect to the constraint [38] . It is based on the comparison of the log likelihood ratio (or any monotone function of the likelihood ratio) to a threshold so that the decision rule is defined by (10) . if else.
(10)
Threshold is chosen such that . The main difficulty now is to measure the log-likelihood under each hypothesis. According to the above simple assumptions, is a central Gaussian vector of length so that (11) where is the covariance matrix of under the hypothesis . For , is a white noise; hence, . Yet, for , the calculus of and of are really cumbersome, even for simple expressions of the filter .
2) Principal Part of the Likelihood: Since the likelihood function is often used in parameter estimation or in hypothesis tests, many works have been done in order to render its use more practical. Whittle suggested to overcome the above-mentioned difficulty by replacing the log likelihood by its principal part , which satisfies (conv. in prob.)
The expression of is simpler than the log likelihood one, and at the same time, estimators and hypothesis tests based on principal parts ratio are proved to be asymptotically equivalent to those based on log likelihood ratios.
Theorem 1 (Whittle): Let the expected power spectral density under hypothesis and the corresponding covariance function of a stationary random process satisfy the following conditions: and . Then, (12) holds for (13) with (14) where is the periodogram of the vector . For practical use, the integral forms in (13) are replaced by their Riemann sums sampled at the Fourier frequencies with . is a power of 2 to speed up the periodogram ordinates calculus. This stems from a new interpretation of Whittle's approximation. Let us recall that the random variables are distributed as a central with 2 degrees of freedom with expectation and variance :
Moreover, if the components of are Gaussian distributed, then the periodograms sampled at Fourier frequencies are independent.
for (16) This equation implies the non correlation of these random variables , hence their independence in the Gaussian case. Let us consider the vector . Its log likelihood under hypothesis is the sum of the components' log likelihood thanks to their independence: (17) 3) Final Decision Rule: Finally, the decision rule is expressed as if else (18) where is the tested statistic, whose expression is (19) The threshold is estimated applying the Neyman-Pearson strategy with respect to the statistic . This statistic is distributed as a with degrees of freedom. For large , we assume it is a normal distribution invoking the central limit theorem so that is calculated replacing by in (4). The mean and the variance under hypothesis are as follows:
We still have to estimate the power spectrum density under both hypotheses .
• : , a white noise. Hence, .
• : , where is a random process independent from . Hence, . The power of the marked vector is . Finally, the tested variable is (22) 4) Power of the Test: Interesting performances are the receiver operating characteristic plotted for a fixed and the power function plotted for a fixed level of false alarm . These curves help comparing different tests. When the sufficient statistic is Gaussian distributed, the power function is given by (5) . To explain how depends on and , we insert the expressions of the expected spectrum of Section III-C3 in (20) and (21) . Then, a Taylor development of the deflection coefficient and the ratio is made with respect to the variable . To estimate the behavior of these expressions as goes large, we assume that the Riemann sums converge to their corresponding integrals, i.e.,
. Here are the results:
The main conclusion is that the deflection coefficient is nearly proportional to , which is lower than in (6). Asymmetric detectors are thus less efficient than DSSS ones by a factor . As is a parameter fixed by the perceptual constraint, the only way to face this inconvenience is to increase the length of the extracted vectors. Usually, dB so that the vectors of an asymmetric scheme should be 10 times longer to reach the same efficiency as DSSS schemes.
Another strategy is to tile the same watermark signal in order to artificially increase the ratio by an average process at the detection stage. In order to fairly analyze the gain of this tiling, we fix the total length of the embedded signals:
is now of length but repeated times. The decision rule works on the vector :
The power is times lower than if we assume that the averaged vectors are independent. Then, the new deflection coefficient of the asymmetric scheme is (24) One notices that tiling does not increase the deflection coefficient of DSSS scheme:
. In this case, the tiling only reduces the complexity of the correlation-based detection. Yet, the tiling also has some drawbacks. It compromises the assumption used to build our decision rule. Moreover, it could introduce a security flaw in our scheme, as explained in Section IV.
D. Asymmetric Methods in the Real World
We have made simple assumptions to properly study the structure of the test and its performances. These assumptions are not always realistic. This subsection focuses on changes implied by the practical use of asymmetric schemes.
1) Modulation of the Perceptual Constraint:
The perceptual constraint usually leads to a modulation by a local gain control of the watermark strength. A more realistic embedding formula is then with (25) This impacts on the expected spectrum under hypothesis .
where is the Fourier transform of the auto-correlation function of the vector . Thanks to the whitening action of the pseudo-random permutation, this vector is assumed to be white so that (27) Finally, we have (28) The conclusion is that the pseudo random permutation boils out the impact of the perceptual modulation. We only have to know the average watermark strength .
2) Composite Alternative Hypothesis:
The knowledge of gain is a very important issue that surprisingly received very little attention in the watermarking community. Indeed, up to now, the detection algorithm is always based on a simple hypothesis test, as described in Section III-C1. This assumption is not realistic: There exist contents that do not bear much watermark strength (e.g., the image "peppers" with lot of uniform areas) and others that are less sensitive to watermark embedding (e.g., the image "baboon" with lot of textured areas). Hence, it is not realistic to pretend that the average watermark strength is the same for all contents. Practical detection algorithms should thus be one sided tests:
versus . This reality may not be a problem in the DSSS method. In (1), neither the sufficient statistic (a linear correlation) nor the threshold (fixed under depends on the parameter . On the other hand, in the asymmetric method, the test is defined only for a given . In other words, whereas in DSSS a uniform most powerful test may exist [38] , in the asymmetric case, it is not possible to find one.
As an illustration of this issue, we distinguish, from now on, the real watermark strength applied at the embedding stage from expected at the detection side. Define . The functions and , and the calculated threshold are drawn on Fig. 3 . It illustrates what happens if we apply the simple hypothesis test strategy: A fixed threshold is calculated for a given , e.g.,
. We note that when , the test is likely to find a watermarked content, except if , where the expectation of the tested statistic falls below the threshold. This means that contents that have received a small amount of watermark energy will never be detected. On the other hand, if the detector has access to the value of , the statistic is compared to the adaptive threshold , and watermarked contents are more likely to be detected, whatever the embedding strength. Some solutions to this problem are proposed in the following.
• : Estimate the pdf of the parameter from a huge amount of contents. The detection uses a Neyman-Pearson test with the parameter that maximizes the expectation of the power function (29) with (30) This is not an easy task as the threshold also depends on the parameter . This test is only optimal when , i.e., there exist other tests more powerful locally. However, globally maximizes the power of the test.
• : Build a test that does not depend on this parameter and is optimal when the two hypothesis are hardly distinguishable, i.e., . This is a locally most powerful test near the frontier of the two hypothesis. It is well known that this test has the structure of the Neyman-Pearson decision rule, where the tested statistic is replaced by its derivative with respect to calculated for [38] . In our case, the test becomes (31)
• : Take advantage of the side information available at the detection stage. Using, in the detector, the same perceptual model as the embedding stage provides an estimate of the watermark strength. We are then back to a simple alternative hypothesis, conditioned for each received content by the side information about the estimated embedding strength.
• : Use a generalized Neyman-Pearson test [38] . Another way to determine the strength is to use a maximum likelihood estimator, i.e., is the parameter maximizing the log likelihood: (32) Then, the classical Neyman-Pearson test proceeds. This is equivalent to the following decision rule: if else.
Whereas the first two tests share the same complexity with the previous one for simple hypotheses, the last two decision rules require more computing power. needs the implementation of the perceptual model used at the embedding stage. needs a gradient algorithm to find the maximum of the log likelihood ratio.
3) Asymptotic Optimality: Having already assumed that goes to infinity, the four previous tests are compared by their asymptotic performances. Define as the Fisher's information with respect to parameter (34) and as the following random variable: 
Moreover, he proves that this test possesses asymptotically the best average power among all decision rules with a level of false alarm . This shows that is asymptotically equivalent to . It is also asymptotically equivalent to the test , as stipulated in [39] , because in probability.
Finally, developing the expression of (37), we notice that the decision rules and are indeed based on proportional statistics.
The asymptotic properties of the Rao test allow us to conclude that the tests , , and are equivalent as goes large. The test will be preferred, as it requires less computing power. Moreover, it has asymptotically the best average power; hence, it outperforms test .
4) Non-Gaussian Distributed Vectors:
In the real world, the extracted vectors are not Gaussian distributed. This pulls down our previous analysis for this simple reason: Equation (16) no longer holds, and the periodograms at Fourier frequencies are no longer independent. According to [40, Prop. 10.3.2] , the periodograms at frequencies have the following properties.
var cov
The fourth cumulant is null for the Gaussian distribution but not necessarily so in the general case: The periodograms are still unbiased estimators of the spectrum of non-Gaussian time series, but their variance increases. Especially, the periodograms are not independent. Our rationale is still valid if we consider the vector of fixed length and when . This means that periodograms for a fixed number of bins are asymptotically independent, but the interpretation of the Whittle principal part in Section III-C2 is no longer true if we consider the statistic defined in (19) . Yet, we will still study it, although we cannot justify its use. Changes appear then in the expressions of and . For instance, let us compare the standard deviation in the non-Gaussian case with in the Gaussian case: (38) where is the kurtosis of the random process in the non-Gaussian case. This increase is relatively small and does not spoil our previous tests.
A much harder issue is the asymptotic Gaussianity of the statistics used in the four proposed tests when the extracted vectors are not Gaussian. As this implies complex mathematical tools far beyond the scope of this paper, we discard any sketch of proof and invite the reader to see theorems developed in the following references. The major argument is that under hypothesis , these decision rules are based on linear functionals of periodograms of white noise. This is directly related to the works of Fay [41] , who proved the asymptotic Gaussianity and consistence of linear and nonlinear functionals of white or linear random processes. Yet, under hypothesis , the watermarked signal is not a linear random process. Nevertheless, the filter has a nonsingular frequency response, and the watermark strength is so small that we can assume the random process is almost white. Moreover, the consistency of our method under real conditions was experimentally assessed in [33] .
IV. SECURITY ASSESSMENT
A. Relationship With Cryptography
To introduce our analysis, we would like to establish some comparisons with basic concepts from cryptography.
1) One-Way Function:
At the embedding stage, the secret key is the set of the following parameters , whereas the detection key is composed of . Hence, there exits a one-way function deriving the detection key from the embedding key. This implies that the detector works without knowing what signal has been added to the content. The use of such a one way function was first mentioned by Diffie and Hellman as mandatory to achieve asymmetric crypto-systems [14] . Later on, this concept led to the famous RSA algorithm, where the noninversion of the one-way function is based on the hard mathematical problem of factoring large integers in prime numbers. Somehow, the only thing we did is to find a one-way function from the signal processing field and to derive a simple watermarking scheme on this basis.
In the same way, the parameter of (9) can be seen as a trapdoor [14] . It is possible to recover the original content from its watermarked version if and only if this trapdoor is known. Yet, remember that the recovery of is not the goal of the pirates. All they need is a content that looks like the distributed content and deludes the detectors. It is possible that such a pirated content could be forged only knowing the detection key. This raises far more concerns as this key is stored in millions of consumer electronic devices.
In other words, whereas asymmetric schemes mean public key crypto-systems in cryptography, this implication is not true in the watermarking field. The detection key is to remain secret. As far as we know, there is thus far no public key watermarking primitives. This highly desired primitive, if it exists, is an asymmetric scheme where it is proved that the knowledge of the detection key cannot help the pirates to forge a convenient content. This is not the case in actual asymmetric techniques. We produced, in [30] , an attack that is available if the detection key is disclosed. This attack threatens all methods unified in this later paper. Thus, the alternative solution we proposed is defenseless against the reverse engineering threat listed in Section II-C.
2) Role of the Pseudo-Random Permutation: The role of the permutation is extremely important. Of course, if the extracted vectors are not white processes, its presence is mandatory to whiten them and to make the detection algorithm work, but this permutation also has a role from a security point of view. It hides in the space where the detection algorithm takes place. Without its knowledge, a dishonest user cannot predict the impact of his attacks on the detection output. The permutation maintains the pirate in a blindness state, where all he can do is to modify the extracted vector and hope that this will flip the detection output.
Let us denote as the extracted vector of the pirated content. We assume that the attack can be modeled by the addition of an independent signal :
. The crucial question is the impact of the vector on the decision rule. It is likely that this permuted vector is also white so that it just lowers the watermark-to-content power ratio to . Because the attack must conserve the quality of the content, it slightly decreases the power ratio. Stern and Tillich investigated the probability that the attack escapes to this likely whitening action of the permutation [28] , [42] . They showed that for a given attack vector and a given watermarked content , the set of the permutations that will give a successful hack is extremely narrow, i.e., its size decreases exponentially as goes large. It results in an exponentially small probability of a successful hack from a blind attack.
The use of pseudo-random permutation is a common thing in cryptography in order to hide the space where cipher texts decryption is feasible. The public key crypto-system of McEliece is such an example [37] .
B. Malicious Attacks
We cannot pretend that the dishonest user will just blindly attack the contents. As described in Section II-C, he will certainly try to gain some information about the secret parameters from a huge amount of protected contents and from the detection black box implemented in devices. This section gives credits to the asymmetric methods, proving their superiority against these malicious attacks.
1) Attacks on Protected Contents: Of course, the "average attack" spotted in Section II-C is no longer valid because of the randomized embedding action of vector . The aim of the pirate is to gain information about the permutation . This is the most important secret parameter as it gives access to the "detection space."
The only way is to manage a brute force attack where the pirate tries all permutations. His issue is then to know whether he has found a suitable permutation. He cannot perform the detection as , which is a secret parameter, is missing. A possibility is to build a detector that distinguishes a white noise from a colored noise, whatever its spectrum's shape. Drouiche and Fay have recently improved prior art of such a detector proposing the following statistic [41] : (39) where is the pooled periodogram over consecutive bins.
, and (we assumed . The deflection coefficient of this test, in our framework, is proportional to . This poor efficiency disables a practical implementation of this watermarked-content-only attack. Nevertheless, this strategy is possible with a known cover content attack as the original signal can be removed.
The set of the permutations is a priori composed of elements. For instance, if , using Sterling's formula, . This outnumbers the particles in the universe . On the other hand, not all permutations are suitable. must have an extremely good scrambling property to whiten the signals. In the same way, the pirate does not have to find the exact permutation but has one sufficiently close to . To better assess the security level against this attack, we suppose that the pirate knows what pseudo-random permutation generator we used. Its seed is a binary sequence of length . It is assumed that all these permutations have a sufficient whitening action and that they are independent. Hence, the brute force attack is reduced to a figure of tries. Imagine that one try (creation of one permutation, interleaving the vector, periodogram calculus, and finally the Drouiche test) lasts 1 s. Then, the pirate is likely to find the permutation in years. Of course, this is a raw estimation of the security level. The pirates may use several computers in parallel, and Moore's law is not taken into account.
2) Attacks on the Detector: The dishonest user is testing the detector feeding it with faked chosen contents. The first difficulty is that he does not have access to the tested statistic but to its binary comparison with the threshold. Hence, he does not always know if its attack has decreased the tested statistic. To overcome this difficulty, Kalker proposed to render the detector sensitive, i.e., to feed it with faked contents whose statistics are close to the threshold. This is the reason why this attack is also called the "sensitivity attack." Doing this, slight changes in the content are likely to flip the detector output, giving information about the detection key. This strategy is efficient with the DSSS method. An estimation of a secret key of length is determined within tries. The pirate removes this estimated signal to the extracted vectors of contents to be forged as in (7). This does not exactly result in the original contents but in good quality forged contents.
This oracle attack does not work so well with this asymmetric method. The first step is to produce vectors whose impact on the detection are known to be negative (i.e., they decrease the tested statistic). Let us create two extracted vectors families and so that and . We require that ; thus, each family contains elements. Both families are closed with respect to the permutation :
Their corresponding periodograms are
The pirate feeds the detector with a faked content whose extracted vector is . We assume the detection rule is . Then, the sufficient statistic is proportional to one of the coefficients of the Fourier series of the sequence :
with If (or ) sets the detector output to one, then it means that (respectively, ). If it is not doing so, then the pirate does not know the influence of the couple of indices in the detection process. If there is such a coefficient , then there are couples increasing the detection output that the pirate can find. These are all the couples such that . Denote the number of Fourier series coefficients such that . The pirate has couples of samples' indices to be modified in order to decrease the tested statistic . The main problem is that the periodogram clearly is a nonlinear function of the samples . For instance, adding the vector to modifies the tested statistic as follows: (40) where is the term for the interference between and :
being the angle of the Fourier transform of at the frequency . The pirate cannot predict this interference term. It clearly depends on the watermarked content he aims to pirate. Its expectation is null, but its variance is proportional to . This term sometimes helps him in his forgery; sometimes it has the opposite effect. Adding some other vectors strengthens his attack, but it also the strengthens interference term. Finally, the pirate cannot predict how many tries are needed to forge a given protected content.
In conclusion, it is recommended that we design the template so that most of its Fourier series coefficients are lower than . At least, the pirate needs tries to retrieve all the available information. This is not considered to be a good security level in cryptography because the attack takes a polynomial time. We would have clearly preferred an exponential time as in the previous section, but it is often required in copy protection that the detector takes a decision every 10 s. Let us suppose that and that the pirate cannot speed up the detection process. For DSSS, tries take almost 2 days. For asymmetric schemes, tries takes 85 years! Once again, this is a raw estimation of the security level. The pirates may use several detectors in parallel. Moreover, once this preliminary step is completed, the attack is a random processing that succeeds after an unknown number of tries, due to the interference term between and .
V. SIMULATIONS
Our simulations are proceeded on still grayscale images of size 512 512 pixels and 8 b/pixel. The media space is the spatial domain.
A. Details About the Technique
In this subsection, we give the details about the implementation of the DSSS technique invented by De Rosa et al. [36] . Its robustness is impressive, especially with the optimal version of the detector [43] .
orders in vector a subset of the magnitude of discrete Fourier transform coefficients of . These coefficients are extracted between the th and the th diagonal in the first quadrant and their symmetrical images in the second quadrant [36] . The mixing function modifies the amplitude of the DFT coefficients store in proportionally to their value:
where fixes the embedding strength. If , then is clipped to 0. The inverse extraction function copies the DFT coefficients of and changes the amplitude of those used at the extraction according to the watermarked vector . It also changes the DFT coefficients of the negatives frequency bins with respect to the symmetry property in order to recover a real array when the IDFT is taken. At last, it quantifies the real array into pixels values in .
B. Human Perception Model
The watermark's invisibility issue is only tackled by the embedding depth , but this action is very limited because the watermark signal, once mapped in the media space, is spread all over the image. Uniform areas of the image are very sensitive to watermark addition so that they only support extremely small embedding depth , whereas edge areas, for instance, support deeper watermark addition. This issue leads to a spatial domain-based human perceptual model giving the amount of noise each pixel can support. We selected the human perception model proposed in [43] . This empirical human perception model gives good experimental results. It is based on the computation of the variance of the 9 9 windowed signal and by normalizing the obtained arrays with respect to its maximum value. Thus, . For better results, we limit the variances to an upper limit and then normalize them. is set to zero near the borders of the picture, i.e., if . Finally, the watermarked content is given by a new inverse extraction function :
where is the pixel-wise product. The influence of this masking function is simply taken into account setting .
C. Receiver Operating Characteristic
Our first experiment is to use a large collection of pictures to estimate the distribution of and then to find the parameter that maximizes the test's power. For and , this happens for extremely small value of this parameter, i.e.,
. It means that the decision rule turns out to be equivalent to the test (cf. Section III-D2) and, by the way, to (cf. Section III-D3). This experiment confirms the Dzhaparidze's theorem about the asymptotic optimality of the Rao test.
Our second experiment draws the experimental receiver operating characteristic of the tests , and in Fig. 4 . We set , , and . We use 150 pictures to estimate the distribution of the tested statistics under hypothesis , and we watermark 50 high-quality pictures to estimate their distribution under . To increase the number of tries, we use 100 different pseudo-random permutations. Moreover, we also plot the characteristics of the decision rules and when the watermark signal is repeated times ( or 8). This results in new vector lengths or . 
D and
D have the same performances. We also tile the watermark signal in order to increase the power ratio G at the detection side. On the other hand, this shortens the vectors, whereas the tests were only assessed asymptotically.
The test is less efficient than the other ones. This reflects the fact that the estimation of parameter at the detection stage is not as easy as it seemed. Especially, if the watermarked content has undergone even a slight compression, this estimation is biased due to the compression noise: Such blind attacks not only tend to decrease the watermark strength, but they also overestimated . This pulls down the efficiency of the test conditioning. As stated by Blahut in [44] , conditioning a test improves its performance in average, but there might be special cases where it spoils its decision. For watermarking techniques, these special cases correspond to common blind attacks; hence it is recommended to give up this test.
The tiling process, of course, increases the performances of the tests, but we notice that for , is clearly less efficient than . These two decision rules are asymptotically equivalent as , i.e., in our experimental environment, if . The benefit of the tiling processing has been proved only when is large, as our rationale is based on asymptotic expressions. It clearly means that the gain of the tiling is limited. A huge number of tiles means short vectors whose length is not large enough to enable the statistical test correctly. Fig. 5 draws the power functions of the tests and for two levels of significance with respect to the number of tiles. For a small number of tiles, the gain of the tiling process is experimentally verified. For bigger numbers of tiles, this gain cannot compete with the loss of efficiency due to the nonasymptotical condition: The power function is then decreasing. This clearly shows that in our experimental environment, the minimum value of is 2048, which implies a maximum of tiles. The security criterion is also limiting the number of tiles. Too big a number of tiles may enable the pirate to estimate the watermark signal, but the averaging process in the detector is computed on the permuted coefficients. Hence, the pirate does not know how to average the coefficients to produce a good estimation of the watermark signal.
D. Robustness Against a Blind Attack
We watermark 50 different pictures with 20 different permutations and compress them with the JPEG algorithm for different quality factor. The power of the test is estimated for two thresholds corresponding to two levels of significance:
and . Fig. 6 shows that the decision rules and face this blind attack in a similar way. This simulation is far more meaningful than checking the presence of watermarking in one compressed image such as Lena. Even for a very low-quality factor, the power of the test is not null. There exist contents where we can still detect the presence of the watermark. We could have presented the same experience only with one of these contents, pretending the technique is robust to JPEG compression. This would have been, of course, absolutely not demonstrative. The power function brings far more information about the robustness against the attack. Fig. 7 is the result of the oracle attack described in Section IV-B2. It shows the number of couples of indices that set the output of the detector to one. This number is given as a percentage of the couples. The threshold is higher for lower levels of significance. Hence, the lower is, the lower the percentage will be. For practical use, is so small that the oracle attack does not provide any information leakage of the secret detection key.
E. Attack on the Detector
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the concept of asymmetry in watermarking, and it details one possible method. This method is versatile, as it can be adapted to a large number of watermarking techniques based on DSSS. On the other hand, we only studied its advantages in the copy protection framework. Our rationale was to describe the targeted application, to analyze the possible threats, and then to estimate the complexity of each class of attacks. This defines the security level that the watermarking technique provides to the global copy protection system.
To the best of our knowledge, a watermarked content only attack is not possible with this method, whereas it is a real threat for DSSS and WCS schemes. A known cover content attack requires a brute force attack of size , whereas a single pair of watermarked/original content is theoretically enough to disclose the secret key in DSSS techniques. The oracle attack needs tries, whereas Kalker has proven that tries are sufficient for DSSS techniques.
The price to be paid is the larger length of the vectors: The asymmetric detectors need more complexity and more memory, and they accumulate a bigger amount of content in order to take a reliable decision. Our future works are the invention of asymmetric schemes with better performances thanks to the side information at the embedding stage.
